
Adam Wenham | Founder & Managing Director, Garrison · 21 October 2026
Published in response to the BMA’s operational resilience and cyber codes, Bermuda’s privacy law (PIPA, enforced by the Privacy Commissioner) and the BMA’s AI governance consultation, which interlock by design.
"Every Bermuda carrier has compliance workstreams. Operational resilience sits with the COO. Cyber risk sits with the IT manager. PIPA sits with the compliance officer or an outside law firm. AI governance — if anyone is thinking about it at all — sits with whoever drew the short straw."
— Adam Wenham, Garrison
Each workstream produces its own assessment, its own gap analysis, its own remediation plan. Each reports to the board separately. Each treats its regulatory framework as an independent obligation to be managed in isolation.
This is the structural problem nobody is talking about. The BMA’s two codes, PIPA and the BMA’s AI governance consultation are not independent. They are interconnected by design. And the carriers managing them in silos are missing the connections that matter most.
Two of these are in force today: the Cyber Code and PIPA. The operational resilience code binds from 31 March 2028. The fourth is a consultation, and it is a forward-looking chapter rather than a quarter of the work.
Consider an outsourcing agreement with an insurance manager. Most Bermuda carriers have one. The insurance manager processes claims, manages bordereaux, handles policyholder correspondence, interacts with cedants. For many carriers, the insurance manager IS the operational backbone.
That single agreement triggers obligations across four regulatory areas simultaneously.
The insurance manager is a critical third-party dependency. Step 2 requires the carrier to map every person, process, technology, facility, and information asset that supports each important business service. If the insurance manager supports claims processing — which it does — the carrier must understand what happens when the insurance manager fails. Can the carrier continue within its impact tolerance? Has it tested that scenario? Does it have an exit plan?
The same insurance manager is a third-party cyber risk. The Cyber Code requires the carrier to assess the manager's cyber controls, include cyber provisions in the SLA, and monitor compliance. If the manager suffers a ransomware attack, the carrier's claims processing stops. Has the carrier assessed the manager's vulnerability management? Its incident response capability? Its data encryption?
The insurance manager is a data processor. It handles policyholder personal information on the carrier's behalf. The carrier remains responsible for how the manager handles that information, so its agreement should say what is processed, where it is stored, whether it crosses borders, and what happens in a breach. Appleby's 2026 review of 200 Bermuda companies found that 44% had no privacy notice. If the insurance manager's privacy practices are deficient, the carrier inherits the liability.
The insurance manager may use AI in claims triage, fraud detection, or automated scoring. If it does, the carrier has a third-party AI use case it may not know about. The BMA's draft guidance encourages carriers to inventory all AI use cases, including those embedded in vendor platforms. AI governance introduces a fourth dimension that carriers should consider, particularly where AI is embedded in third-party services.
One agreement. Two BMA codes, PIPA and a consultation. Four sets of obligations. And in most carriers, four different people are assessing this agreement independently — if they are assessing it at all.
A Big Four firm assesses your cyber posture. They produce a cyber risk report. It covers the Cyber Code's requirements. It identifies gaps. It recommends remediation. It can run to six figures.
The report does not mention that your insurance manager's cyber controls also affect your OpRes resilience, your PIPA compliance, and your AI governance posture. It does not connect the cyber gap to the outsourcing overlay. It does not flag that the same remediation action — improving the insurance manager's incident response capability — satisfies requirements across three other frameworks simultaneously.
A law firm assesses your PIPA compliance. They review your privacy notice, your data processing agreements, your cross-border transfer arrangements. They identify gaps. They recommend contract amendments. They charge by the hour.
The law firm does not mention that the data processing agreement they are reviewing also needs to satisfy the Cyber Code's third-party cyber provisions and the OpRes Code's outsourcing governance requirements. Three sets of contractual obligations, one agreement, and nobody has read it across all three lenses.
The carrier receives two reports. Neither talks to the other. The board sees cyber gaps in one presentation and PIPA gaps in another. Nobody connects them. Nobody says: "The same insurance manager agreement is creating gaps across four regulatory areas, and fixing it once — properly — satisfies requirements across all of them."
This is not a theoretical risk. Few if any firms currently deliver a single assessment that maps evidence across all four regulatory areas simultaneously — and the BMA's own supervisory findings support the consequence. The BMA's 2025 Operational Cyber Risk Management Report found that 21% of entities had not completed data classification — a requirement that underpins both the Cyber Code's data classification requirement and PIPA's data inventory obligations. Appleby's 2026 review of 200 Bermuda companies found that 44% had no privacy notice. These are not isolated findings. They are symptoms of a compliance model that treats interconnected frameworks as separate problems.
The alternative is an assessment that maps evidence across all three regimes and the consultation at once.
A data classification register satisfies the Cyber Code's data classification requirement. It also supports the PIPA data inventory obligation. It also informs the OpRes dependency mapping by identifying which information assets are critical. One document, three frameworks, three requirements satisfied — or three gaps identified, depending on whether the register exists and whether it is current.
A BCP test report satisfies OpRes Step 5. It also satisfies the Cyber Code's recovery requirements. If the scenario tested involves a third-party failure, it informs the outsourcing overlay assessment. If the business continuity plan relies on AI-driven processes, it triggers the AI governance materiality assessment. One test, four connections.
A vendor cyber assessment satisfies the Cyber Code's third-party requirements. It also satisfies the OpRes mapping requirements for the same vendor. It also informs the PIPA assessment of whether the vendor's data handling meets the carrier's privacy obligations. If the vendor uses AI, it feeds the AI governance inventory. One assessment, four regulatory areas.
The efficiency gain is real: evidence produced once satisfies multiple requirements. But the risk surface is equally real: a gap in one piece of evidence creates gaps across multiple frameworks. A missing data processing agreement is not just a PIPA problem. It is a PIPA problem, a Cyber Code problem, and an OpRes problem simultaneously. A carrier that discovers this in a siloed assessment fixes the PIPA gap and never realises the Cyber and OpRes gaps exist.
The OpRes Code requires carriers to complete all seven steps and have a board-approved self-assessment, available to the BMA on request, by 31 March 2028. Step 2, mapping resources and dependencies, requires understanding every third-party relationship, every technology platform, every information asset that supports each important business service. That mapping exercise, done properly, touches every regulatory framework the carrier is subject to.
A carrier that begins its OpRes self-assessment in Q1 2028 has three months to complete a seven-step programme that, done properly, takes 12-18 months. A carrier that begins now has time to assess, remediate, and evidence compliance before the deadline.
The question is not whether a carrier needs a compliance assessment. The BMA expects it. The question is whether that assessment is siloed — one framework at a time, one report per workstream, no connections made — or cross-domain — all four regulatory areas assessed simultaneously, every piece of evidence mapped across every requirement it satisfies, every gap identified in its full regulatory context.
And the practical endpoint of any assessment is the carrier's own board-approved self-assessment. The self-assessment carriers must have in place by 31 March 2028 must demonstrate compliance across the OpRes lifecycle — and that demonstration depends on evidence that touches every framework the carrier is subject to. A cross-domain assessment produces the evidence map, the gap analysis, and the remediation roadmap that feeds directly into the self-assessment. A siloed assessment produces three reports that the carrier must manually reconcile before the board can approve it. The assessment methodology determines whether the self-assessment is a board paper drawn from current evidence or a scramble when the BMA asks to see it.
Beyond the structural gaps, there is a temporal gap that is equally dangerous and far more common.
Most carriers have policies. They were written two or three years ago. They were approved by the board at the time. They have not been reviewed since. The BCP was last tested eighteen months ago. The penetration test is fourteen months old. The privacy notice references legislation that has been amended.
These are not missing documents. They are stale documents. The carrier has evidence — but the evidence has expired against its own stated commitments.
This is a critical distinction. Evidence staleness should be measured against the carrier's own policies, not against an arbitrary standard. If the carrier's business continuity policy commits to annual testing and the last test was eighteen months ago, the carrier has failed its own standard. If the policy commits to biennial testing and the last test was eighteen months ago, the carrier is within tolerance. The assessment should reflect what the carrier promised to do — and whether it has done it.
The BMA assesses carriers against their own frameworks. A carrier that commits to rigorous standards and falls short is in a worse position than a carrier that commits to appropriate standards and meets them. Evidence currency is not about having the most recent documents. It is about delivering what the carrier told the regulator it would deliver.
The assessment could be conducted by the carrier's own compliance team, by an insurance manager, by a Big Four firm, or by a specialist consultant. The BMA makes no prescription about who delivers it — only that the carrier can demonstrate compliance through current, complete, and verifiable evidence.
The practical reality for most Bermuda carriers — particularly Class 3B and smaller Class 4 carriers — is that the internal team is too small, an insurance manager cannot independently assess the services it provides, and a large firm's engagement is often priced and scoped for larger organisations.
What matters is not who conducts the assessment but how it is conducted. A cross-domain methodology that maps evidence across all four regulatory areas simultaneously will identify connections and gaps that a siloed assessment structurally cannot. Whether that methodology is delivered by an external consultant, an internal team with the right training, or a combination of both is a commercial decision for each carrier.
See the service. The Cross-Domain Diagnostic: five weeks, fixed fee, every regime rated the way it applies, and every answer in your BMA cyber filing return traced to evidence. garrison.re/diagnostic
About the author. Adam Wenham is the founder of Garrison, a Bermuda firm that provides senior technology leadership to Bermuda’s regulated firms: covering technology seats, running programmes, bringing in specialists and getting firms ready for the BMA’s technology codes. He led technology transformation and operational resilience at the Bank of England, held senior roles across operations, engineering, architecture, innovation and change during seventeen years at Credit Suisse, and led the technology modernisation function at StoneX. At both Credit Suisse and StoneX he led the technology side of mergers and acquisitions. He began his career at Barclays, where he ran the technology for the move of BZW's 3,500-strong investment bank and its 1,300-position dealing room to Canary Wharf. adam@garrison.re
Garrison · Hamilton, Bermuda · adam@garrison.re
Practitioner analysis, not legal advice. More at garrison.re/analysis